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This study sheds some new light on possible sources of producer hetero-
geneity, within and across industries, by studying the determinants of
plant failure in Swedish manufacturing during the 1990-96 period using
longitudinal linked employee-employer data.
The creation and destruction of production units play an integral part
in the growth process and have important implications for the individuals
in the work force. For instance: In Swedish manufacturing at least some
10 percent of the growth in productivity over the 1989-1996 period can be
directly attributed to the fact that entering plants had higher than average
productivity and that exiting plants had lower than average productivity.
Measured in terms of annual job reallocation, plant turnover constitutes
some 15-30 percent of all jobs reallocated in Swedish manufacturing and
becomes increasingly important in the longer run (Andersson, 1999). In
spite of their important consequences, the existing knowledge about the
driving forces of plant closures is quite scarce.1
We derive hypotheses about the determinants of plant exit from a
model of imperfect competition in which plants are exposed to stochastic
productivity shocks that are realized after wages have been determined
in plant-level negotiations. This way there are direct links between the
likelihood of plant failure and industry-speciﬁc characteristics of produc-
tion and product demand, on the one hand, and between the likelihood
of plant failure and the local labor market conditions, on the other hand.
If it further is assumed that only ’insiders’ (workers with some senior-
ity) are party of the negotiations (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989), insider
mechanisms are introduced as a possible explanation for within-industry
diﬀerences in the failure probability across plants. In particular, we ex-
pect higher wage pressure and higher risks of plant closures in plants with
relatively few insiders, since the ex ante risk of dismissal for an insider is
lower as compared to the risk of dismissal for an insider in a plant with
many insiders. Access to longitudinal linked employer-employee data en-
ables us to separate insiders from outsiders in terms of their plant-level
seniority.
1T h es p e c i a li s s u eo fInternational Journal of Industrial Organization (Vol. 13, No.
4, 1995) is dedicated to plant turnover and growth pattern of ﬁrms and plants. Also
in the job ﬂow literature, many contributions to our understanding of the post-entry
behavior of plants can be found (e.g. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996).
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able to analyze possible eﬀects of the plant’s human capital structure on
the exit probability. Investments in plant-speciﬁc human capital through
training or learning-by-doing would generally increase the rents to be
shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. Given that the extra rents gener-
ated are not fully captured by the workers, this would provide a rationale
for why plants with workers having a high degree of plant-speciﬁch u m a n
capital exhibit a higher reluctancy to shut down operations. Another rea-
son why the human capital structure of a plant could make a diﬀerence for
the shut-down decision is if there are non-uniform costs associated with
the dismissal of workers.
Another possible source of heterogeneity that we consider are plant-
speciﬁca g ee ﬀects. Models that emphasize selection mechanism (e.g.
Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson, 1992) predict that younger estab-
lishments are more likely to exit than older ones are because of greater
uncertainty surrounding their true eﬃciency level. The empirical support
is strong for high exit rates among young plants (Audretsch and Mah-
mood, 1994; Audretsch and Mahmood, 1995; Persson, 1999; Sanghamitra
and Krishna, 1997; Boeri and Bellman, 1995; Mata and Portugal, 1994).
A partly competing hypothesis could be derived from the capital vin-
tage literature (e.g. Solow, 1956). Interpreted at the micro level, this liter-
ature suggests that establishments using technologies of older vintages are
more likely to exit, as they utilize less eﬃcient technologies. Technology
vintage eﬀects have received little empirical attention and, if at all dis-
cussed, been rejected as important based on the ﬁnding that the hazard of
plant failure is decreasing in plant age. This conclusion might be prema-
ture, since plant and technology age do not need to coincide, as is the case
in some more recent capital vintage models that stress the possibility of
updating to newer technology without shutting down the establishment.
I ft h i si st h ec a s ean e g a t i v ed u r a t i o nd e p e n d e n c ew i t hr e s p e c tt op l a n ta g e
cannot be interpreted in terms of the importance of selection mechanisms,
since the omission of technology age as an explanatory variable could gen-
erate the negative duration dependence per se.2 To our knowledge, the
2See Kiefer (1988); Lancaster (1990). The intuition behind this result is simple: Since
plants with favorable technology on average will live longer, the mixture distribution will
change over time so that the fraction of plants with favorable technology will increase as
time goes by. Thus, the longer spells are overrepresented by plants with the low failure
probability.
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eﬀects is the study of Salvanes and Tveter˚ as (1998), in which plant age
is separated from capital age. It ﬁnds distinct and diﬀerent eﬀects from
capital and plant age. It is not obvious to us, however, that the vintage of
capital is a good proxy for the vintage of technology, as the introduction
of new technology not necessarily can be captured by a single-dimensioned
index like a capital vintage index. Our measure of technology age is based
on the view that new technology can be introduced and implemented in a
myriad of ways, which result in changes in the productivity level. Empir-
ically we capture this by analyzing the plants’ ’Solow-residual’.
Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that, besides industry-speciﬁca n dr e -
gional labor market eﬀects, insider mechanisms, the structure of human
capital, as well as the diﬀerent age eﬀects are important determinants of
plant failure. By and large the results conform to our ap r i o r ihypotheses.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way. It starts
out with a general motivation for our research topic by presenting some
evidence on the importance of plant turnover in Swedish manufacturing
in terms of its links to productivity growth (section 2). Section 3 puts
our empirical analysis into the context of a theoretical model of plant
failure that we develop. Section 4 describes the empirical counterparts of
the variables in the theoretical model. Data and the statistical model are
presented in section 5. The results from the empirical analysis is presented
in section 6, before ﬁnally concluding in section 7.
2 Plant turnover and productivity growth
In this section we motivate our research topic by presenting some basic
facts on how plant turnover and its components relate to productivity
growth. (The implications on individuals, in terms of changes in income,
employment status, etc., because of the reshuﬄing of jobs induced by plant
turnover could have served as another motivation.) The close relationship
between plant turnover and productivity growth is hardly a new idea, but
has been around at least since the days of Schumpeter. For instance,
the notion of creative destruction expresses the necessity to replace old
technologies in order to adopt new ones, which often is assumed to be
accommodated by plant turnover.
To get a feeling of how important this process might be, Table 1
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tered within the t−n period and of plants that will exit within the t+n pe-
riod, relative to the productivity of continuing plants, Pen/Pc and Pex/Pc.
The ﬁgures are annual averages and refers to the stock of manufacturing
plants in the 1985-96 period.
Table 1: Relative Productitivity of entering and exiting plants1
Entering Plants Exiting Plants
Time span Pen/Pc Nen/NE ﬀect2 Pex/Pc Nex/NE ﬀect3
t ± 1 0.97 0.03 -0.1 0.75 0.04 1.0
t ± 3 1.03 0.06 0.2 0.76 0.12 2.9
t ± 5 1.04 0.08 0.3 0.77 0.19 4.4
1 The table reports the productivity in period t of plants that have entered (will exit)
within the t − n (t + n) period relative to the productivity of continuing plants in
period t.
2 Refers to the eﬀect on the manufacturing productivity in t (in percentage points)
because entering plants diﬀer in productivity from continuing plants in period t.
3 Refers to the eﬀect on the manufacturing productivity in t+n (in percentage points)
because exiting plants diﬀer in productivity from continuing plants in period t.
From the ﬁr s tr o wo fe n t r i e s ,w el e a r nt h a tp l a n t st h a th a v ee n t e r e d
during the course of a year on average contribute negatively to the growth
in manufacturing productivity, as their productivity is somewhat lower
relative to the productivity of continuing plants. Plants that will exit
within the next year on average contribute positively to the growth in
manufacturing productivity, as their productivity is substantially lower as
compared to the productivity in continuing plants.
In the second and third row of entries, the time horizon is increased,
so that an entering (exiting) plant is deﬁned as a plant that has entered
(will exit) within the t − 3( t +3 )a n dt − 5( t + 5) period, respectively.
In the longer run, exiting as well as entering plants contribute positively
to manufacturing productivity growth. The productivity of plants that
have entered within the last 3 and 5 years is actually higher relative to the
productivity of continuing plants. The diﬀerent results for the entering
plants in the long and short run suggest that the returns to entry do not
come immediately and/or that the less eﬃcient entrants are sorted out in
3Measured as the value-added per worker deﬂated by a three-digit level producer
price index.
6 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresthe longer run.
The eﬀect on manufacturing productivity growth is quite large in the
longer run (t ± 5), partly because the employment shares, Nen/N and
Nex/N, get large as the time horizon is increased. The average labor
productivity in Swedish manufacturing would on average had been 0.4
percentage points lower if the entering plants had not entered and 4.4
percent lower if the exiting plants had not exited.
We end this section by concluding that the entry and, in particular,
the exit of plants are important phenomena in the process of growth.
Furthermore, the close relationship between the plant turnover and pro-
ductivity growth indicates that the productivity of the plant is likely to
be a good predictor of plant exit. However, based on these ”raw” facts
we are not able to discriminate between the various possible underlying
forces of plant exit mentioned in the introduction, since most of them, in
one way or another, are related to plant-level productivity.
3 A model of plant failure
In order to ﬁx ideas and to provide guidance for what variables to in-
clude in the empirical analysis, it is useful to consider a simple theoretical
framework.4
We assume an economy in which plants produce slightly diﬀerentiated
products that are sold in monopolistic competition.5 In the short run
labor is the only variable factor of production. Production and the inverse
demand function for a plant are assumed to be
Y = εALα = εq (1)
and
P = Dq−1/η (2)
4See Hamermesh (1993) for an alternative model of plant failure. Also see Antelius
and Lundberg (2000) for a study of the determinants of job reallocation across industries.
5By focusing on plants we assume that the important economic decisions are made
at the plant-level, rather than at the ﬁrm-level. The empirical analysis is also conducted
at the plant-level. However, we also analyze single-unit plants (i.e. plants in which ﬁrm-
and plant-level decision making coincide) separately.
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D is demand index and η > 1. Apart from the stochastic productivity
parameter, the parameters of production and demand are assumed to be
the same for all plants within an industry.
In each period the plant is, with probability λ, e x p o s e dt oa ni d i o s y n -
cratic productivity shock drawn from the distribution f(ε). Conditional
on the stochastic productivity component the plant will decide whether to
continue operations and, if so, employment, output and prices.
According to equation (1) and (2) proﬁti sg i v e nb y
π = εDqκ(L) − wL (3)
where κ =1− 1/η. Labor is assumed to be determined optimally at all
times by the ﬁrst order condition, such that the marginal revenue product
equals the bargained wage rate or
L =( w/αεκDAκ)−1/(1−ακ) (4)
It is assumed that a plant exits the market if maximized current proﬁts
fall below a certain target proﬁt value, π∗, or
π(L(ε)) ≤ π∗ (5)
where π (L(ε)) is obtained by inserting equation (4) in equation (3). For
now on π∗ is assumed to be exogenous, but possible determinants of the
target proﬁt value will be discussed later on.
According to the previous, the reservation productivity, ε∗, which
solves π(ε∗)=π∗, expressed in logarithms, is
lnε∗ =( 1− ακ)[lnπ∗ − ln(1 − ακ)] + ακ[lnw − ln(ακ)] − lnD − κlnA
(6)




f(ε)dε = λF(ε∗)( 7 )
6This shock can equally well be thought of as a demand shock or a combination of
both without changing anything in the analysis.
8 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresEquation (7) implicitly deﬁnes a relationship between θ and the arguments
of π and π∗.
The engine of plant closures in this theoretical framework is unfavor-
able productivity (or demand) shocks, but how responsive a plant is to a
shock depends to a large extent on industry-speciﬁc factors such as the
parameters of production and product demand. Note that, so far, this
model has no predictive power of which plants within a certain industry
and region that are most likely to shut down. From comparative statics
on equation (6) and (7) we learn that the probability of plant failure is
higher the higher is the shock intensity, λ, the lower is the labor productiv-
ity, A, the lower is the product demand, D, the lower is the labor intensity,
α, and the higher is the product market competitiveness, η(κ). Also ex-
ogenous increases in wages, w, and in the target proﬁtv a l u e ,π∗, would
increase the failure probability. However, we extend the model to allow
for the possibility that these latter variables are determined endogenously
and, thus, plant-speciﬁc explanations for within-industry diﬀerences in the
failure probabilities across plants are introduced.
3.1 Wage determination
Although the wage setting in the Nordic countries is often thought to be
highly centralized, the wage setting process actually takes place at two
levels, at the industry level (centralized) and in local negotiations (wage
drift). Thus, industry- as well as plant-speciﬁce ﬀects may both play
important parts in wage determination. Another institutional feature that
may be of importance is the strict employment protection legislation in
Sweden, which, for instance, determines the order by which employees
should be dismissed.
Based on these facts, we think it is appropriate to explicitly take into
account that wages are determined locally in negotiations between the
workers and the employers in our model. Also, we should consider the
fact that not all workers face the same risk of being dismissed, because of
the employment protection rules.
Wages are assumed to be determined in plant-level negotiations and
the timing of the model is such that wages are set before the idiosyncratic
shock is realized. Extending slightly to the model presented in Layard,
Nickell, and Jackman (1991), we assume that the bargain over wages at
IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 9the plant level is the one which maximizes
χ =[ ( w − O)S]β[πe − π∗]( 8 )
where w is the real wage, O is the worker’s expected income if no agreement
is reached and e denotes expectations. The owner of the plant is assumed
to receive π∗ in case of no agreement.7 S is the probability of remaining
i nt h es a m ep l a n tt h en e x tp e r i o dg i v e nt h eo u t c o m eo ft h eb a r g a i n .O n l y
workers who remain in the plant from the previous period, LI, are assumed
to take part of the wage bargain and they only care about their own utility.
More formally, if we deﬁne δ a st h ef r a c t i o no fe m p l o y e e sw i t hn os e n i o r i t y
(newly hired since the last period), then at any given point of time the
number of insiders is given by LI =( 1− δ)L. These assumptions then
imply that the probability of remaining in the plant for an ’insider’ is
higher if the number of insiders is relatively small as compared to expected
employment, (i.e. S0(LI/Le(w)) < 0).












and with the previous assumptions about production and product demand,









L = ηSL∗ηLw = ηSL∗(1−ακ)−1 we














where ηSL is the individual employee’s elasticity of remaining in the same
plant with respect to expected employment and with η0
SL > 0.8
We assume that the option value of the worker is given by O = p(u)w+
(1 − p( u))b. p(u) is the probability of remaining unemployed in the case
7An alternative threat point of the owner, which simpliﬁes matters but may be less
realistic in the face of the previous discussion concerning the target proﬁt, would be to
assume that the owners receive nothing in case of no agreement.
8In the case where the plant owner’s threat point is zero equation (10) reduces to
the wage equation in partial equilibrium in Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991). This
extension does not change any comparative statics.
10 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresof dismissal, being a function of the unemployment rate with p0 < 0; w is
the outside wage level and b the beneﬁt level in case of unemployment.
Thus, with wage bargaining at the plant level, local labor market con-
ditions, in terms of outside incomes and the probability to obtain a new
j o bi nc a s eo fu n e m p l o y m e n t ,w i l la l s om a k ead i ﬀerence on the shut-down
probability, since these factors aﬀect the wage pressure. Furthermore, with
the assumption made that only insiders take part of the wage negotiation,
the share of insiders at the plant level will also aﬀect the survival capacity
of the plant, because the dismissal probability for an insider is aﬀected by
the composition of outsiders and insiders at the plant.
Working through the comparative statics of (6), (7) and (10) enables
us to summarize the implications of the model by that the probability of
plant failure is higher:
• the higher is the shock intensity in the industry, λ
• the greater is the union power, β
• the lower is the unemployment rate, u
• the higher is the relevant outside wage, w
• the higher is the unemployment beneﬁtl e v e l ,b
• the smaller is the share of insiders in the plant as compared to current
employment, LI/L
• the higher is the target level of proﬁts at the plant, π∗.
Furthermore, the probability of plant failure is indeterminate with re-
spect to,
• the product market competitiveness, κ
• the labor intensity, α
• the product demand, D
• the common productivity level, A.
IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 11The latter eﬀects are indeterminate to the extent that the direct eﬀect
on the reservation productivity is counteracted by an indirect eﬀect work-
ing through wages. Consider for instance an increase in product demand:
as a direct eﬀect this will increase the likelihood to survive because of
larger revenues, but this eﬀect is counteracted, at least in the longer run,
by the indirect eﬀect working through higher wage pressure.
3.2 Endogenous target proﬁt
It may very well be the case that the target value of proﬁts, π∗, should
not be regarded as exogenous either. Factors that may inﬂuence π∗ could
be more closely examined if the model would be formulated as a dynamic
optimization problem. One such possible formulation of the target proﬁt
could be derived from a search model framework, in which potential en-
trepreneurs each period make an innovation corresponding to a speciﬁc
value in the distribution of idiosyncratic shocks and then choose between
becoming an operational entrepreneur or remain idle. Without providing
any further details of the derivation (available upon request), one possible
formulation of the target proﬁti s





[1 − F(x)]π0(x)dx (11)
where z is the alternative income of the owner of the plant; K sunk costs
associated with plant entry and plant exit; and r is the discount rate.
Then the target proﬁt would be increasing in alternative incomes of the
owner, decreasing in sunk costs associated with entry and decreasing in
the option value of continuing production. The option value of continuing
production, in turn, is higher the higher is the expected value of a shock,
the less likely it is to be exposed to a shock and the lower the discount
rate is.9
We consider a number of theoretical mechanisms, namely plant-speciﬁc
human capital, selection mechanisms, and technology vintage eﬀects, that
could be thought of as aﬀecting the shutdown condition through the de-
terminants of the target proﬁt level. We in the proceeding only discuss
9One should note that if the target proﬁt is endogenously determined, then it is no
longer possible to determine the sign of the eﬀect of an increased shock intensity, λ, on
the exit probability. As far as we can tell, this is not the case for any other variables in
the model.
12 IFAU — Determinants of plant closureshow these considerations may aﬀect the shutdown condition through the
determinants of the target proﬁt (equation (11)).
3.2.1 Plant-speciﬁc human capital
The acquisition of plant-speciﬁc human capital through training or learning-
by-doing would generally increase the rents to be shared between the
worker and the owners of the plant. Given that the extra rents gener-
ated are not fully captured by the workers (i.e. β 6= 1), this would provide
a rationale for why plants intense in speciﬁc human capital exhibit a higher
reluctancy to shut down operations (Oi, 1962; Becker, 1964).
I nt e r m so fe q u a t i o n( 1 1 )i n v e s t m e n t si ns p e c i ﬁc human capital could
be thought of as increases in π0(x). Thus, the option value of continu-
ing operations increases and the target proﬁt value, π∗, decreases, which
in turn would decrease the reservation productivity, ε∗, and the failure
probability, θ.
Another reason why the human capital structure of a plant may make
ad i ﬀerence for the shut-down decision is if there are non-uniform (sunk)
costs associated with the dismissal of workers. Higher dismissal costs
decreases π∗ (through higher K) and lowers the failure probability.
3.2.2 Selection mechanisms
In Jovanovic’s (1982) selection model, growth and survival of ﬁrms is the
result of heterogeneity in the eﬃciency level across producers. Generally,
the individual producer does not know the true cost relative to other
competitors in the industry at the time of entry. (All producers have
the same initial belief about the true π0(x)) In the selection process, the
true eﬃciency relative to others is gradually unveiled via the outcome of
production (which implies heterogeneity in π∗ with respect to the relative
eﬃciency level of the plant). This is a model of passive learning, in the
sense that producers cannot inﬂuence its true eﬃciency level, but costliness
upgrade its belief about their true level of eﬃciency in the production
process.10
10See Pakes and Ericson (1992) for an alternative model in which the assumption of
passive learning is relaxed. Unlike the passive learning model, the producer can improve
its position in the distribution of eﬃciency levels across plants through investments in
research and development. Both these models predict that younger plants are more
likely to exit than older plants.
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A partly competing hypothesis is derived from capital vintage models (e.g.
Solow, 1956). The main point in capital vintage models is that capital of
later vintages is more eﬃcient than capital of older vintages. Technologies
of various vintages will coexist because of sunk costs associated with the
installation of new capital. The strength of vintage eﬀe c ti na ni n d u s t r y
is dependent on the level of sunk costs and the degree of substitutability
between factors of production. Industries with high sunk costs and low
elasticity of substitution should be characterized by strong vintage eﬀects
and low turnover rates, while industries with low sunk costs and unstable
relative input and output prices show high exit rates (Lambson, 1991).
Interpreted at the producer level we would expect higher exit rates
among plants utilizing older technologies inferior to newer more eﬃcient
technologies. In terms of the determinants of the target proﬁtl e v e li n
equation (11), using technologies that become inferior relative to newer
ones will reduce π0(x) and the option value of continuing production (be-
cause wages are expected to increase through the workers’ outside option
value) and increase the alternative income of the owner, z (i.e., investing
in a new plant becomes a more attractive alternative). Thus, the target
proﬁt level increases and the failure probability is expected to increase
with the age of technology.
4 The empirical counterparts
The quest is to ﬁnd the empirical counterparts to the variables motivated
by theory in the preceding section. Here we brieﬂy describe the variables
included and put forward our hypothesis. Summary statistics, spell char-
acteristics and exact deﬁnitions of the variables are found in Appendix
A.1.
As a measure of the shock intensity, λ, we include the job reallocation
rate at the industry level. There are possibly two counteracting eﬀects
of an increased shock intensity. The direct eﬀect is that the probability
of exit increases, because the employers are more likely to be exposed to
a bad outcome. The indirect eﬀect, if target proﬁts are assumed to be
endogenous, is that the employers option value of continuing operation
decreases, which lowers the exit probability.11
11It should be noted that job reallocation is likely to be dependent on not only the
14 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresWith respect to the parameters of the production function, we include
the share of wage costs in the industry as a measure of α and as a measure
of A we use the average labor productivity deﬂated by a producer-price
index at the three-digit level.
With respect to the parameters of the product demand function: We
include the ’Herﬁn d a h li n d e x ’a sam e a s u r eo fκ. With κ →∞(per-
fect competition) the ’Herﬁndahl’ index, which has been calculated as the
squared sum of the plant’s share of sales in the industry, is expected to
approach zero and with κ → 0 (monopoly) it would approach unity.12 We
construct industry-speciﬁc indexes of demand as a proxy for D,b a s e do n
the development of average working hours per employee in the industries.
These considerations more or less cover the implications from the basic
theoretical framework with exogenous wage and target proﬁt determina-
tion, apart from some variables, such as unemployment beneﬁts and union
power, for which we either cannot obtain any good measures or do not have
any variation to explore.
4.1 Measuring wage determinants
As a measure of the share of insiders in the plant ((LI/L)=1 − δ),
we include the share of employees who remained in the plant at least
since the previous year. For instance, assume that employment in period
t − 1i s1 5a n d1 0i np e r i o dt. If this employment change has been the
resulting sum of 10 quits and/or layoﬀs and 5 hirings, then the share of
insiders in period t would be 0.5 according to our deﬁnition. The outside
options for a worker, O, is captured by including the average wage and
the unemployment rate in the region. We expect the exit probability to
increase as the share of insiders decreases and as the outside option for
the worker increases, because of the eﬀects on the wage pressure.
shock intensity in the industry per se, but also on the other parameters of production,
demand and the wage bargain. Also the rate of job reallocation may approximate other
factors, like the product life cycle and the pace of technological progress in the industry.
Thus, this variable may serve as proxy for several factors and should be treated with
some caution when interpreted.
12Ideally we would like to obtain measures also on the competion from abroad, which
we do not have in our data.
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We include average plant size in the industry to approximate sunk costs
and minimum eﬃcient scale, having the hypothesis that the exit probabil-
ity decrease with plant size. It should be noted that if sunk costs mainly
are associated with capital in general our measure of the wage cost share
m a yp i c ku pt h ee ﬀects of sunk costs.
Theoretically we also argued that the plant-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a l ,
selection mechanisms and technology vintage eﬀects aﬀect the target proﬁt
value and, thereby, the failure probability.
4.2.1 Measuring human capital
We control for the human capital structure of the plant by including the
average age in the workforce, the share of males, the share of Swedish
citizens, the fraction of workers with university education and the fraction
of workers with educations oriented towards technical subjects. Which
types of labor that are intense in plant-speciﬁc human capital and/or are
associated with high ﬁr i n gc o s t si sp r e t t ym u c ha ne m p i r i c a lq u e s t i o n .
Though, through longer experience, we expect that the degree of plant
speciﬁcity in the human capital to be higher among older workers than
younger. If highly educated workers and workers with educations oriented
towards technical educations are more involved in the development of plant
speciﬁc technologies, we may expect that there are larger quasi rents to
be shared, and presumably lower probabilities of plant exit, in plants with
workers with these characteristics.
4.2.2 Measuring age eﬀects
In order to test the importance of selection mechanisms, i.e. that newly
created plants face a higher risk of plant failure, we include plant age,
w h i c hi ss i m p l ym e a s u r e da st h en u m b e ro fy e a r ss i n c ep l a n te n t r y . I f
selection mechanisms are important we would expect the exit probability
to decrease with plant age.
Measuring the age of technology is clearly a more problematic task
and deserves to be put in some focus. Capital vintage models diﬀer
with respect to how technology advances are implemented at the micro
level. In some models (e.g. Caballero and Hammour, 1995), new tech-
nology is embodied in the plant and, thus, productivity advances is im-
16 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresplemented through the entry and exit of plants. This type of capital
vintage models has motivated the use of plant age as a proxy for the vin-
tage of technology in empirical studies (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1990; Ca-
ballero and Hammour, 1996). This presumption probably has poor em-
pirical support (Dunne, 1994). In other models technology advances takes
place through investments in physical capital (Solow, 1956; Cooper, Halti-
wanger, and Power, 1995; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1998; Mortensen and
P i s s a r i d e s ,1 9 9 8 ) . T h i st y p eo fm o d e l sh a v ei nt u r nm o t i v a t e dt h eu s e
of capital vintage indexes as a proxy for technology age (Salvanes and
Tveter˚ as, 1998). However, the empirical support for this presumption is
questionable as well.
Our view is that technology advances is implemented in a myriad of
ways, for instance by changes in the human capital and in organization.
This view is consistent with the view in Harberger (1998), where it is
argued that aggregate productivity growth stems ”from 1001 diﬀerent
sources”. Therefore, we do not believe that the vintage of technology
- which really is the concern of capital vintage models - can be captured
along a single dimensioned measure like the vintage of physical capital,
which furthermore is probably hard to measure with any greater accuracy.
That is, new technologies may as well consist of new ways to organize pro-
duction and not only of investments in new machines, which has been the
traditional view. No matter what the underlying sources of technological
change are, it is likely that they involve some degree of sunk costs and,
thus, give rise to vintage eﬀects if the input is subject to technology ad-
vances. Given that no set of measures probably ever can cover all the
dimensions of new technology, it seems reasonable to base the measure of
technology on its consequences rather than on its exact sources.
We conjecture that the introduction of new technology at the plant
level is associated with changes in the plant-level productivity. However,
not all changes in productivity is associated with technology vintage ef-
fects. In particular, new technology that is not associated with any sunk
costs should not give rise to vintage eﬀects. Since such technologies can
be easily adopted by all plants without changing the relative productivity
distribution across plants, we instead associate the introduction of new
technology with changes in the plant-speciﬁc productivity level. That is,
we decompose the state of technology, Aet, of a plant into the three com-
ponents
Aet = At + Ast + e Aet (12)
IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 17where At is the productivity component common to all plants at period
t, Ast is the component common to all plants in the same industry and,
ﬁnally, e Aet is the plant-speciﬁc component of productivity.
E m p i r i c a l l yw eu s et h ep l a n t ’ sa v e r a g ep r o d u c e r - p r i c ed e ﬂated labor
productivity as a measure of Aet, from which we determine e Aet by sub-
tracting the corresponding aggregate measures.
There are at least four worries associated with such a approach. The id-
iosyncratic productivity component, besides technology, could also reﬂect:
1) the scale of operations, unless technology is characterized by constant
return to scale; 2) the degree of capacity utilization; 3) the mix of inputs
used in production; and 4) measurement errors, for instance unobservable
inputs. To account for the degree of capacity utilization and scale eﬀects,
we require that the change exceed a certain threshold value in order to
be associated with the introduction of new technology. Empirically the
threshold value is chosen such that it represents a certain percentile in
the distribution of idiosyncratic labor productivity changes. Our measure
of technology age is deﬁned as the number of years since the change in
productivity exceeded a certain threshold value. To overcome the issue of
changes in the mix of inputs an alternative approach could be to estimate
the ”Solow residual” of the plant, instead of using the ”raw” idiosyncratic
labor productivity component. The reason why this is not undertaken is
that we deliberately want to keep our notion of technology broad, in the
sense that changes in the scale of operations and mix of inputs by pro-
ducers within the same industry facing similar conditions could very well
be thought of as representing changes in technology. (Another important
reason is that we lack data on important inputs other than labor, e.g.
managerial skills and plant-level capital measures.) As a sensitivity anal-
ysis (reported in appendix) we experiment with diﬀerent threshold values
and with other identifying assumptions about when new technology is in-
troduced. In particular we test the hypothesis that the results are caused
by measurement errors and other temporary movements in productivity,
by requiring long-lasting eﬀects.
We expect the probability of plant failure to be decreasing in plant age
and increasing in our measure of technology age.13
13Becuase the complementarity between technologies of diﬀerent vintages is likely to
be decreasing in the age distance, this argument is true even for given proﬁtl e v e l sa n d
given sunk costs.
18 IFAU — Determinants of plant closures5 Data and statistical model
5.1 Data
This section describes data. More details on data and on how the analyt-
ical data set was created can be found in Appendix A.1.
Our data set consists of information from three diﬀerent data sources,
namely Manufacturing Statistics (”Industristatistiken” or IS), the Central
Firm and Establishment Registry (”Centrala F¨ oretags- och Arbetsst¨ alle-
registret” or CFAR) and the Regional Employment Statistics (”˚ Arlig re-
gional syssels¨ attningsstatistik” or ˚ Arsys). IS contains plant-level infor-
mation about almost the universe of plants in mining and manufacturing
(major division 2-3) over the 1970-96 period. (There are some restrictions
with respect to the very smallest of plants.) IS has been merged with
CFAR, which contains explicit information about the date of entry and
the possible date of exit of all plants in the population, and with ˚ Arsys,
which contains human capital information about the individuals in the
plants from 1985-96. The linkage to CFAR has enhanced the quality of
data, in the sense that we are able to discriminate between plants missing
in data from true plant exits.
Our analysis is limited to the stock of plants in the 1991 and the inﬂow
of plants in our observation period 1991-96, the period in which we have
full information about the variables of interest.14 This period covers a
rather extreme recession as well as a peak. As compared to the period
1970-90, employment has never declined so fast as it did in the 1991-93
period and it has never increased by as much as it did in the 1994-96
period.
From the stock of plants in the 1991 we sample those plants that
entered after 1972, which is the earliest year of entry that we can identify
in CFAR. This implies that we observe spells as long as 24 years.15 Of all
diﬀerent plants in our sample, 23 percent entered during our observation
period. In total the analytical data set covers 22 998 observations on 7
228 diﬀerent plants.
To fully understand the concept of plant failure, we stress that mergers,
acquisitions, changes in ownership and so on will generally not result in
14Another reason why we limit the analysis to this period is changes in the population
in IS in 1990 that are hard to handle longitudinally.
15B e c a u s ev e r yf e ws p e l l sw i t hap l a n ta g eo fm o r et h a n2 0y e a r sa r eo b s e r v e d ,w e
treat those as having a plant age of exactly 20 years in the empirical analysis.
IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 19plant failures in our data, unless the plant is actually physically shut
down.16
5.2 Statistical model and maximum likelihood estimation
Data is such that we only observe whether a plant continues its operation
or is shut down, but, of course, not the actual risk of plant failure. This
is normally analyzed in limited dependent variable models, such as the
logit or the probit model. We instead analyze data in terms of a discrete
hazard model, since duration dependence is of interest in some of our
speciﬁcations. However, in the case when time is of no interest the model
generalizes to the limited dependent variable model known as the Weibull
probability model.
The data in our analysis is interval censored, such that we only observe
time to lie between a pair of consecutive follow-ups.17 Time is divided into
k intervals [0,1),[1,2),...,[q,∞)w h e r eq = k −1. In our analysis k is 24
years, which corresponds to the maximum number of years of a completed
spell. The discrete hazard function is given by
λ(t|x(t)) = Pr(T = t|T ≥ t,x(t)),t =1 ,...,q (13)
where T = t denotes failure in the [t−1,t)i n t e r v a la n dλ(t|x(t)) is the con-
ditional probability of failure in that interval, given the interval is reached
and given a vector of (possibly time-varying) covariates, x(t).18 Corre-
spondingly, the discrete survival function of the probability of reaching
the [t − 1,t)i n t e r v a li s
Pr(T ≥ t|x(t)) = S(t|x(t)) =
t−1 Q
i=1
(1 − λ(i|x(i)). (14)
To account for left-censored cases with known entry times, which is a
feature of data, we need to modify (14) slightly. The conditional proba-
bility of reaching the [t − 1,t) interval for a left-truncated case must be
16The concept of a plant is deﬁned only in terms of geographical location and pro-
duction. (See SCB, Various years)
17Overviews of the econometric analysis using duration data can be found in Fahrmeir
and Tutz (1994), Lancaster (1990), and Kiefer (1988)
18In fact, by failure in t we mean that the plant is not in existence at any time during
t + 1. This way we reduce possible problems with endogeneity and are able to measure
the covariates with higher accuracy.
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(1 − λ(i|x(i)) =
t−1 Q
i=s
(1 − λ(i|x(i)) (15)
where s indicates the truncation point.19 (For all non-left censored cases
in the proceeding s equals zero).
Consider ﬁrst the likelihood contribution of plant-failure in the [t−1,t)
interval. The unconditional probability of failure in the [t − 1,t)i n t e r v a l
is given by the product of (13) and (15)












where yi =( yis,...,y it)=( 0 ,...,0,1) for a non-censored case and where
yit = 1 indicates failure in the [t−1,t) interval. Similarly the contribution
of the right-censored observation is given by (15), which can be written as
(16), but where yi =( yis,...,yit)=( 0 ,...,0). Summing over all n plants,







[yij logλ(i|xij)+( 1− yij)log(1 − λ(i|xij)]. (17)
Once a parametric model of the hazard function is chosen, it is straight
forward to estimate (17) by maximum likelihood. We consider the pro-
portional hazard model, which in continuous time is given by
λc(t|x(t)) = λ0(t)exp(x(t)0γ) (18)
where λc denotes the continuous hazard function and where λ0(t)i st h e
baseline hazard at time t and where γ is a vector of unknown parameters.
The proportional hazard speciﬁcation assumes that all covariates, includ-
i n gt e c h n o l o g ya g e ,o n l yh a v ep r o p o r t i o n a le ﬀects on the baseline hazard,
19How to handle left-truncated cases with known dates of entry is analyzed in Guo
(1993)
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where the second equality follows assuming constant hazard and covariates
in each time interval and where η(t)=l n
t+1 R
t
λ0(u)du. Inserting (19) into
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If ηt = η, i.e. there is no duration dependence the expression is re-
duced to the likelihood function of the Weibull probability model (Greene,
1993).20
6R e s u l t s
Our empirical strategy is to estimate versions of the empirical equivalent
to equation (7), which deﬁnes a relationship between the probability of
plant failure and the arguments of proﬁta n dt a r g e tp r o ﬁt. We ﬁrst esti-
mate our basic model of plant failure assuming that wages are exogenous.
After having rejected the hypothesis that wages are exogenous, we then
successively add to our analysis the eﬀects of endogenous wage and target
proﬁt determination.
The results (not reported) from the model in which plant-level wages
are assumed to be exogenous are implausible, in the sense that higher
wages are associated with lower failure probabilities. A likely interpreta-
tion of this result is that higher plant-level wages reﬂect larger rents to
be shared between the workers and the owners of the plant. Higher wages
could of course also reﬂect diﬀerences in the human capital structure of
20Apart from the less familiar Weibull probability model, we have estimated our
speciﬁcations as logit models, but since the results do not diﬀer substantially we do not
comment on those.
22 IFAU — Determinants of plant closurest h ep l a n tt h a tm a yh a v ea ni n ﬂuence on the failure probability and which
we do not control for.
To control for diﬀerences in the human capital structure across plants
and to test for the assumed exogeneity of wages, we ﬁrst estimated a simple
plant level wage equation by ordinary least squares and then inserted the
plant level wage measure together with the predicted residual from the ﬁrst
stage wage equation in the exit equation (speciﬁcation (i) of Table 2).21
Variables denoted by s are speciﬁc to the 18 industries in our data, those
denoted by r are speciﬁc to the 24 regions used and those denoted by e
are speciﬁc to the plant. Under the hypothesis that wages are exogenously
determined, the eﬀect of the residual is expected to be zero. However,
this model suggests that wages are not exogenously determined, since the
eﬀect of the predicted residual is negative and highly signiﬁcant, i.e. higher
unexplained wages are associated with a lower failure probability. Thus,
we reject the hypothesis of exogenously determined wages.22
6.1 Industry eﬀects and endogenous wage determination
In speciﬁcation (ii) in Table 2 we report the results from a model in which
wages are assumed to be endogenously determined and, thus, the plant-
level wage measure is replaced by a measure for the outside wage, as
deﬁned previously. Furthermore, it is assumed that the unions are egali-
tarian (i.e. unions that care equally for insiders and outsiders) and thus
we do not include the insider share variable.
All estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and conform to our ap r i o r i
hypotheses. The probability of plant failure is higher for plants in indus-
tries characterized by high job reallocation rates, which is our proxy for
the shock intensity in the industry.23 With respect to the parameters of
21The dependent variable in the wage regression is the logarithm of the deﬂated
average wage cost in the plant and the included human capital variables are: average
age and age squared of the workers, fraction of males, fraction of workers with Swedish
citizenships, fraction of workers with university education and fraction of workers with
educations oriented towards technical subjects.
22One could of course argue that unobserved diﬀerences in the human capital structure
that are correlated with the failure probability is the main cause for the results, rather
than endogenous wages. However, if we to the ﬁrst stage equation add ﬁxed plant eﬀects,
the sign and signiﬁcance of the residual in the exit equation are virtually unchanged.
23There might be endogeneity problems associated with this variable, but at least it
does not make any diﬀerence whether plant reallocation induced by plant turnover is
excluded from our job reallocation measure or not.
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the lower is the wage cost share and the lower is the average labor produc-
tivity. Correspondingly, for the parameters of demand function, the risk
is higher, the more competitive the industry is and the lower the product
demand is, as measured by the Herﬁndahl index and working hours, re-
spectively. The risk of plant closure increases with the local wage level and
decreases with the local unemployment rate. We like to interpret this as
that when the option value of the workers increases this results in higher
wage pressure which reduces the survival capacity of the plant.
In speciﬁcation (iii) we test the hypothesis that insider wage determi-
nation is of importance by including the measure of the share of insiders
in the plant. The parameter estimate of the share of insiders suggests that
there are also important elements of insider mechanisms in wage bargain-
ing. The magnitude is such that a 10 percentage point increase in the
share of insiders in the plant reduces the failure probability by some 5
percent. We like to interpret this as that when the share of insiders in a
plant is low, then the ex ante risk of loosing the job is lower for an insider
and the insiders therefore exert higher wage pressure.
However, we are at risk of underestimating the importance of insider
mechanisms if plant exit is a long-lasting process in which employment is
gradually decreased until exit, which then endogenously would create a
large fraction of insiders in plants about to exit the market. To, at least
partly, test the importance of this we replace our insider-share measure
by the average share of insiders in the plant (excluding the possible year
of exit). Now, the parameter estimate of the insider share changes quite a
deal. The implied magnitude is such that a 10 percentage point increase
in the share of insiders in the plant reduces the failure probability by some
8 percent. In the proceeding we use the plant average insider share as the
insider share measure.
Common for the previous speciﬁcations is an underlying assumption
that all diﬀerences between industries and regions are captured by the
included variables. In column (v) we check the robustness of the previous
results when we in addition control for ﬁxed regional and industrial eﬀects.
This reduces the signiﬁcance of many of the industry variables, although
the eﬀects of the local labor market conditions and the share of insiders
at the plant level remain intact. It should be noted, though, that this
speciﬁcation probably is over-parameterized, since there is little variation
in data across industries and regions to explore in order to identify the
24 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresTable 2: Determinants of plant exit with insider wage determination
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Variable Parameter estimates
Job reallocations (λ ) 5.294 2.631 2.612 2.399 -0.406 -0.844
(0.564) (0.618) (0.619) (0.623) (0.788) (0.918)
Wage cost shares (α )- 0 . 0 9 6 -0.855 -0.926 -0.992 -0.491 -0.321
(0.344) (0.361)( 0 . 3 6 1) (0.362) (1.550) (1.591)
ln(Labor prod.s )( A) -0.216 -0.684 -0.746 -0.793 -0.619 0.015
(0.085) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.455) (0.497)
Herﬁndahl indexs (κ ) -5.313 -2.468 -2.303 -1.880 -2.317- 4 . 185
(1.291)( 1.312) (1.311)( 1.319) (6.511) (6.809)
ln(Working hourss )( D )0 . 0 18 -0.391 -0.432 -0.447 -3.511 -3.293
(0.175) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.589) (0.625)
ln(Avg. plant sizes )( π
∗ ) 0.117 -0.144 -0.144 -0.119 -1.451 -0.890
(0.051) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.414) (0.453)
ln(wagee/r)( w) 0.332 0.649 0.741 0.823 2.132 0.911
(0.206) (0.131)( 0 . 131)( 0 . 132) (0.506) (0.579)
Wage residual -0.274
(0.043)
Unemploymentr (u) -4.397 -3.698 -3.785 -7.485 -8.326
(0.565) (0.564) (0.564) (1.407) (5.413)
Sh. of insiderse (L
I/L) -0.613 -1.588 -1.578 -1.576
(0.046) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
Industrial dummies no no no no yes yes
Regional dummies no no no no yes yes
Time dummies no no no no no yes
Log likelihood -8403 -8366 -8287 -7945 -7853 -7843
Standard errors are reported within the parentheses. Parameter estimates in bold (italics)
indicate signiﬁcance on the 5- (10-) percent level.
All speciﬁcations also include a constant.
In speciﬁcation (i) the (time-varying) wage measure is speciﬁc to the plant and in speciﬁca-
tions (ii)-(vi) it is speciﬁc to the region. See text for details.
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In column (vi), as compared to (v), we add a full set of time dum-
mies. As expected this has an impact on the signiﬁcance of some of the
presumably trended variables, such as unemployment, productivity and
wages.24
In short: Our results suggest that endogenous wage determination are
of importance in explaining plant failure, in the sense that the eﬀects of the
worker’s outside option and the eﬀect of the insider share at the plant are
robust throughout the various speciﬁcations. The results on the industry
variables also support our ap r i o r ihypotheses, but they are not robust
against the inclusion of a full set of industry dummies.
Additional sensitivity analyses have been performed by the inclusion
of controls for various initial conditions, such as the plant’s size at the
time of entry25 and whether the plant was created as a part of an already
existing ﬁrm or not, but these extensions do not change results in any
substantial ways and, thus, they are not reported. Also, in the analysis
we have excluded the mining industry and multi-plants (i.e. plants in
which ﬁrm- and plant-level decision making do not coincide) , but we ﬁnd
no major changes in results.
6.2 Human capital eﬀects
We have argued that diﬀerences in the human capital structure could be
one potential source of heterogeneity across plants. Either because these
diﬀerences also reﬂect diﬀerences in the degree of plant-speciﬁch u m a n
capital or because they reﬂect diﬀerences in ﬁring costs. Another moti-
vation why we should control for the human capital at the plant level is
that our previous results regarding the eﬀects of the insider share could be
spurious, in the sense that the variable could approximate plant speciﬁc
human capital.
In column (i) of Table 3 we add plant-level human capital measures
to speciﬁcation (v) of Table 2. The estimates of the aggregated variables
are not shown in the table, since they remain by and large unchanged as
compared to column (v) in the previous table.
24Instead of time dummies we have tried capturing the eﬀects of the business cycle
by including the net employment change at the industry level. However, no major
diﬀerences were found as compared to using time dummies.
25This variable could be motivated to include as a proxy for plant-level capital, for
26 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresTable 3: Determinants of plant exit including human capital and age
eﬀects
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Variable Parameter estimates
Sh. of insiderse (L
I/L) -1.582 -1.555 -1.529 -1.551 -1.267
(0.048) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053)
Agee 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mane -0.098 -0.101 -0.087 -0.079 -0.205
(0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114)
Swedishe -0.474 -0.475 -0.459 -0.418 -0.711
(0.146) (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) (0.144)
Universitye -0.123 -0.126 -0.116- 0 . 138 0.164
(0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126)
Technicale 0.185 0.184 0.175 0.156 0.385
(0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115)
Plant Agee -0.004 -0.011 0.033 -0.023




(0 . 0 0 1) (0.001)






(Plant Age*Tech Age)e -0.007 -0.009
(0.002) (0.002)
Log likelihood -7838 -7836 -7830 -7806 -7920
Standard errors are reported within parentheses. Parameter estimates in bold
(italics) indicate signiﬁcance on the 5- (10-) percent level.
In addition all speciﬁcations include controls for the same aggregate variables
as in speciﬁcation (v) of Table 2.
The inclusion of human capital variables do not change the estimated
eﬀect of the insider share. Somewhat surprisingly, although the ap r i o r i
expectations regarding these variables are not all that clear, we do not
ﬁnd any strong eﬀects of the human capital structure of the plant, except
for the fraction of workers with Swedish citizenship. One could perhaps
which we do not have any measurs on.
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Swedish labor market, but it is open question what the exact mechanisms
generating the results are. The estimates may reﬂect the fact that when
a plant is about to shut down, the employer ranks among the employees
when ﬁring, such that the most ”valuable” workers are ﬁred last. The em-
ployer protection legislation in Sweden may contribute to this, especially
with respect to the estimate of the mean age of the worker. To partly, but
not fully, overcome this potential problem the human capital measures are
averaged over the plant’s life time (excluding the possible year of failure),
as was done with the insider share variable.
6.3 Plant and technology age eﬀects
Implicitly, so far, it has been assumed that the risk of plant failure exhibits
no duration dependence. However, as was argued previously there are
good reasons to believe that various age eﬀects are important sources of
plant heterogeneity. Furthermore, the previous estimates of the insider
share are at risk of being biased because young plants by construction
have a large fraction of ”outsiders”.
F o ri l l u s t r a t i v ep u r p o s e sw eh a v ee s t i m a t e dt h ee ﬀects of plant and
technology age semi-parametrically, by allowing for piece-wise constant
eﬀects, without any other covariates than industrial and regional dum-
mies. The result is illustrated in Figure 1 where the hazard rate with
respect to plant age is evaluated at diﬀerent ”technology ages”. The re-
sult with respect to the age of the establishment conforms to what has
been found in previous studies, namely that the risk of plant failure is
decreasing in the age of the plant. This could be interpreted in terms of
the importance of selection mechanism, but an alternative hypothesis is
that omitted variables (other than technology age, industrial and regional
eﬀects) generate the negative duration dependence. Also, there seems to
be important eﬀects of the technology age, such that the likelihood of
plant closure is higher the older technology being used.
In column (ii) of Table 3 we add a linear eﬀect of plant age to the
previous speciﬁcation. Although negative, the linear eﬀect of plant age on
the failure probability is not statistically signiﬁcant. It should be noted
that the inclusion of plant age does not aﬀe c tt h ep o i n te s t i m a t eo ft h e
share of insiders.
When we in column (iii) add our measure of technology age the eﬀect










































Figure 2: The hazard function with respect to plant and technology age
according to speciﬁcation (iv) in Table 3 where the rest of the covariates
are set at their mean value.
IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 29of plant age is signiﬁcantly negative. The estimate of plant age suggests
that a newly created plant faces an 11 percent higher risk of plant failure as
compared to a plant that has been in existence for 10 years. The hazard
is increasing in our measure of technology age, which then lends some
support to technology vintage models. For instance, the results imply
that utilizing technology with an estimated age of 10 years relative to new
technology increases the probability of plant failure by 19 percent.26
T h er e s u l ti nc o l u m n( i v ) ,i nw h i c hw ea d da ni n t e r a c t i o nt e r mb e t w e e n
plant and technology age and second degree polynomials of plant and
technology age, indicates that the eﬀects of plant and technology age are
not independent from each other. The estimates of the eﬀect of plant
age suggest that the risk of plant failure increases until approximately the
eighth year of the plant’s life time and thereafter the risk decreases. This
pattern is not contradicted by the prediction from the theory of selection
(Jovanovic, 1982). The hazard rate with respect to plant age is also more
decreasing the older technology used. The hazard rate with respect to
technology age, on the other hand, is increasing at an increasing rate. The
relationship between the hazard rate, plant age and technology age from
column (v) of Table 3 is perhaps best illustrated in a three dimensional
plan (Figure 2).
As our theoretical model is speciﬁed, the employment and the exit de-
cisions are simultaneously undertaken and what we estimate is a reduced
form of plant failure in which employment has been replaced by its deter-
m i n a n t s .H o w e v e r ,i tc a nb ea r g u e dt h a ts o m eo ft h ev a r i a b l e su s e di nt h e
estimation are partly determined by current employment. If this would be
the case, our estimates are at risk of being contaminated by endogeneity
bias. For instance, it has been argued that smaller plants utilize tempo-
rary employment to a larger extent than larger plants do. If this is correct,
the eﬀect of the share of insiders at the plant partly captures the eﬀect
of the endogenously determined current plant size. Also, the deﬁnition of
our technology age measure involves the volatility in plant-level produc-
tivity, which is likely to be decreasing in plant size. Thus, there might be
a spurious positive correlation between technology age and plant size.
To overcome possible bias resulting from this, we in speciﬁcation (vi)
replace the plant-level measures by their size-orthogonal equivalents (ex-
cept for plant age, which is a truly exogenous variable). That is, we
26The qualitative results are about the same if we instead model the age eﬀects semi-
paremetrically, by allowing for piece-wise constant eﬀects.
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plant-level variables on current employment. Indeed, the results change
somewhat. The eﬀect of the insider share is reduced, but it is still highly
economically and statistically signiﬁcant; the eﬀect of technology age is re-
inforced by the ”size correction”, as expected; the hazard is still decreasing
in plant age, but the shape is somewhat diﬀerent from the previous spec-
iﬁcation; the eﬀects from the plant-level human capital structure tell us,
in addition to what was previously found, that the failure probability is
higher the lower the fraction of men in the work force is and the more
educated the work force is.
In short: Our results indicate weak and mixed eﬀects of the plant-level
human capital structure on the failure probability. We ﬁnd support for
selection mechanisms in the sense that older plants have lower failure prob-
abilities, ceteris paribus. We also ﬁnd strong support for technology vin-
tage eﬀects. In Appendix A.1 we show that our main conclusion regarding
technology age is not very sensitive with respect to various assumptional
changes about how technology age is measured. Still, admittedly there are
remaining uncertainties surrounding what our technology age measure ex-
actly reﬂects and, therefore, we stress that this eﬀect should be interpreted
with some caution.27
7 Conclusions
Despite a growing literature on producer heterogeneity, its exact sources
are not very well explored. In the face of this, the main contribution of this
paper is that we address the empirical importance of a number of potential
such plant-speciﬁc sources by studying the determinants of plant failure
on a sample of establishments in the Swedish mining and manufacturing
industries over the 1991-96 period.
From our theoretical framework we test hypotheses regarding the link-
27Because of the uncertainties surrounding the technology age measure, we do not
pursue the analysis further. Still it could be interesting information that in a previous
version of this study, we extended the analysis to allow for heterogenous technology
vintage eﬀects by including interactions between our technology age measure and the
human capital structure of the plant. One interesting result that came out was that
labor intense plants with older workers experienced the strongest vintage eﬀects. This
could perhaps be interpreted in terms of the importance of technologial advances in the
human capital during the 1990s.
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acteristics of production and product demand. The results do at least not
contradict what we can expect from our theoretical framework. Never-
theless, a model including only variables reﬂecting characteristics of the
industry and the region is of limited interest, since it has no predictive
p o w e ro fw h yc e r t a i np l a n t sw i t h i nas p e c i ﬁc industry and region face
higher risks of failure than others and, thus, do not add very much to our
understanding of the sources of producer heterogeneity at the micro level.
However, we argued theoretically that insider mechanisms in wage de-
termination may be one potentially important source of heterogeneity in
the risk of plant failure across plants. If only insiders take part in the
plant-level wage negotiation, then a low fraction of insiders relative to ex-
pected employment in the plant implies an increased wage pressure, since
the risk for an insider of being laid oﬀ is relatively low. This in turn
would increase the risk of plant failure. Our empirical analysis indeed
suggests that this is the case and that the result seems to be quite ro-
bust to alternative hypothesis. The order of magnitude is such that if the
share of insiders in the plant increases by ten percentage points, then the
probability of plant closure decreases by approximately eight percent.
Another potential source of producer heterogeneity that we have ad-
dressed is diﬀerences in the structure of human capital across plants. How-
ever, we ﬁnd weak eﬀe c t sf r o mt h ev a r i a b l e sr e ﬂecting the human capital
structure of the plant. On the other hand, it is neither clear cut what we
should expect ap r i o r ifrom these variables.
Previous studies have also looked upon the importance of selection
mechanisms by studying the hazard rate with respect to plant age. We ad-
dress this source of heterogeneity as well, but unlike most previous studies
we also make an attempt to disentangle and empirically test the impor-
tance of plant and technology age. (The access to spells that are much
longer than most previous studies makes the analysis of the latter eﬀect
meaningful). In accordance to what has been previously found, our re-
sults suggest that selection mechanisms are of importance, in the sense
that older plants have lower failure probabilities.
There is also evidence that the hazard of plant failure is increasing in
our technology age measure, thus, lending some support to the hypothe-
sis stemming from the capital vintage literature that plants utilizing old
technologies are more likely to shut down.
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IFAU — Determinants of plant closures 35A Appendix
This appendix serves two purposes: A.1 describes how the analytical data
set was constructed along with deﬁnitions and summary statistics of the
most important variables used in the empirical analysis. One crucial as-
sumption in our analysis is how technology age is measured. Therefore we
in A.2 conduct some sensitivity analysis in order to give some indications
on how robust our previous conclusions are.
A.1 The analytical data set and variables
Our analysis is limited to the stock of existing plants and the inﬂow of
entrants in mining and manufacturing industries during the 1991-96 pe-
riod. From this sample in Manufacturing Statistics (IS) we have made a
number of restrictions that deserve to be put in focus. First of all we have
excluded all plants in existence prior to 1972, which is the earliest year of
entry that we can identify in the Central Firm and Establishment Registry
(CFAR). Human capital information has been appended to the analyti-
cal data set through a linkage between IS and the Regional Employment
Statistics (˚ Arsys). A number of observations had to be excluded from the
analytical data set because the match quality was not satisfying, evalu-
ated by comparing the employment and changes in employment according
to the two data sets. Because of missing information on human capital
variables we have imputed (through extrapolation) values in some cases,
where it has been regarded as possible, while deleted observations in other
cases, in which the basis for imputation was not satisfying (i.e. when we
would have had to impute more than 3 consecutive values). All in all,
we had to exclude some 5 percent of the plants from the original sample
because of poor match quality or because of missing information, and we
had to impute human capital information values in some 7 percent of the
remaining cases.
• Job reallocation (λ) in the industry in period t is calculated as the
sum of the number of jobs created and destroyed across plants be-
tween t − 1a n dt d i v i d e db yt h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fj o b si nt h e
industry.
• T h ew a g ec o s ts h a r e( α) is measured as wage costs over total input
costs in the industry.
36 IFAU — Determinants of plant closures• Productivity (A) is measured as the average labor productivity in
the industry deﬂated by a producer price index at the three-digit
level. This variable is transformed into logarithms.
• The Herﬁndahl index (κ)i sm e a s u r e da st h es u mo ft h es q u a r e d
shares of plant sales in the industry.
• Working hours (D) is measure as average working hours (in 1000)
per workers and year. This variable is transformed into logarithms
• Average plant size (π∗)i sm e a s u r e da st h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fe m -
ployees in the plants in an industry.
• Wage (w) is measured as the average, producer-price deﬂated, wage-
costs in the region (corresponding to ”l¨ an”). This variable is trans-
formed into logarithms.
• T h eu n e m p l o y m e n tr a t e( u)i sm e a s u r e da st h et o t a l( o p e n l yu n e m -
ployed and in labor market programs) unemployment divided by the
labor force in the region.
• The share of insiders ((LI/L)=1− δ) in the plant is measured as
the fraction of employees in period t that were also employed by the
same plant the previous year.
• The age of the employees in each plant (Age)i se x p r e s s e da sa n
average over the number of employees and over the plant’s existence,
excluding the possible year of failure. This variable is divided by 100.
• The number of men (Man); individuals with Swedish citizenship
(Swedish); individuals with more education than high school (Uni-
versity); and individuals with an education within the engineering
programs, either in high school or in the university, (Technical), are
expressed as fractions.
• Plant age (PlantAge)i sd e ﬁned as the number of years since plant
entry.
• Our preferred measure of technology age (Tech. Age)i sd e ﬁned as
the number of years, since the last time the change in the idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity exceeded a threshold value. In our pre-
ferred speciﬁcation we compare the productivity in t with that in
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labor productivity changes as our threshold value.
A.2 Sensitivity analysis with respect to how technology age
is measured
Our measure of technology age is based on the idea that the introduction
of new technology can be determined by analyzing the ”Solow residual”.
However, how large the change in the Solow residual must be in order to
represent the introduction of new technology is arbitrarily chosen. There-
fore, it is of interest to ﬁnd out whether our results are robust against
choosing diﬀerent threshold values.
Our preferred measure of technology age was constructed such that
new technology was identiﬁed when the annual change in the idiosyncratic
productivity exceeded the 90:th percentile in the distribution of annual
changes in plant-level productivity (see the ﬁrst column of Table 6). The
second column shows how the age parameters change when a much lower
percentile value (the 25:th) is chosen. The remaining covariates through-
out Table 6 coincide with speciﬁcation (v) in Table 3. In the third and
fourth column we have used the absolute change in the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity with diﬀerent threshold values. This is done in order to capture
the idea that also negative changes could reﬂect the introduction of new
technology, because of a possibly long lasting retooling process. Finally,
in the ﬁfth and sixth column, we test the hypothesis that the results are
caused by temporary movements (or possible measurement errors) in the
idiosyncratic productivity. That is, contrary to previous speciﬁcations,
we require the shifts in the productivity to have permanent eﬀects, in the
sense that we compare average lag and lead productivity for each year
of the plants’ life-time and if the diﬀerence exceeds the threshold value
in the distribution of changes then we identify the introduction of new
technology. Needless to say this procedure may introduce new problems,
since our measure now is conditional on future events.
The results in Table 6 show that the estimated eﬀects are somewhat
sensitive with respect to how technology age is measured, in the sense
that the eﬀects of plant age and that the exact functional form of the re-
lationship between the age eﬀects and the hazard vary between the spec-
iﬁcations. However, the main conclusion - that the hazard is increasing
38 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresin technology age - seems to be robust against these diﬀerent measures
considered.28
Table 4: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Job reallocations 0.163 0.037 0.066 0.312
Wage cost shares 0.369 0.097 0.166 0.526
ln (productivity)s 4.458 0.349 3.876 5.444
Herﬁndahl indexs 0.017 0.019 0.004 0.139
ln (working hours)s 1.009 0.194 0.571 1.327
ln (average plant size)s 3.450 0.605 2.026 4.994
ln (wage)r 3.777 0.287 3.773 4.487
Unemploymentr 0.102 0.038 0.025 0.183
Share of insiderse 0.669 0.364 0 1
Agee 38.627 5.275 20.333 66
Malee 0.750 0.212 0 1
Swedishe 0.907 0.122 0 1
Universitye 0.132 0.154 0 1
Technicale 0.395 0.218 0 1
Plant agee 9.257 6.735 0 24
Tech. agee 4.038 5.146 0 24
# of obs. 22998
The table shows the summary statistics of the transformed vari-
ables, as used in the empirical analysis. Foot index s denotes
variables that are speciﬁc to the industries, r variables speciﬁct o
the regions and e variables speciﬁc to the plants.
28The rest of the parameters (see Table 3, column (v)) remain about unchanged.
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plant age



























The table shows the distribution of
plantfailure and censoring by plant
age.
40 IFAU — Determinants of plant closuresTable 6: The impact of diﬀerent measures of technology age
Temporary Permanent
Threshold (percentile) 90:th 25:th abs(90:th) abs(25:th) 90:th 25:th
Variable Parameter estimates
Plant age -0.022 -0.024 0.003 0.001 -0.204 0.009
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.026) (0.012)
(Plant age)
2 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)( 0 . 0 0 1) (0.002) (0.001)
Tech. age 0.070 0.101 0.032 0.054 0.244 0.041
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) (0.025) (0.017)
(Tech. age)
2 0.007 -0.002 0.019 0.023 -0.008 -0.011
(0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Plant age*Tech. age -0.011 -0.001 -0.021 -0.024 0.000 0.010
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.002)
Log likelihood -8095 -8076 -8090 -8104 -7957 -8088
Standard errors within parentheses.Parameter estimates in bold (italics) indicate signiﬁcance
on the 5- (10-) percent level.
In addition all speciﬁcations include controls for the same variables as in speciﬁcation (v) of
Table 3.
”Temporary” refers to the analysis of the annual change in the idiosyncratic productivity and
”Permanent” refers to the diﬀerence between the lag and lead mean productivity throughout
the plant’s life-time for each year.
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